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The death Of Alfred rewane: New US District Court Documents Detail James Ibori’s Criminal Ties to the Abacha Regime

Saharareporters has obtained new US court documents that provide fresh clues into the criminal past of former Governor James Onafefe Ibori of Delta State. Saharareporters was first to unearth details of Ibori’s conviction in England on shoplifting and larceny charges. His wife, Theresa Nakanda Ibori, was also convicted along with him in England.
 

Image removed.Saharareporters has obtained new US court documents that provide fresh clues into the criminal past of former Governor James Onafefe Ibori of Delta State. Saharareporters was first to unearth details of Ibori’s conviction in England on shoplifting and larceny charges. His wife, Theresa Nakanda Ibori, was also convicted along with him in England.

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The latest court documents -UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: v.$1,09,000.40 in U.S.CURRENCY -from the US establish that Ibori was engaged in serious criminal activities in the days of General Sani Abacha, the late dictator who unleashed a reign of terror and mindless looting in Nigeria.

The recently obtained documents pertain to an asset forfeiture settlement between Ibori and the United States Secret Service in the US District Court in Maryland. The case stemmed from numerous wire transfers of substantial sums of cash into Ibori’s accounts with Citibank. The funds were wired from accounts in Switzerland.

A US justice department source who recently became familiar with the case told Saharareporters that the documents unraveled a pattern of money laundering and patronage that Ibori enjoyed during the Abacha regime. However, at the time of forfeiture of the assets, the US authorities thought the monies were proceeds from 419 activities, instead of pay-offs for Ibori’s dastardly work for the Abacha regime.

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A retired colonel told our correspondent that Ibori “provided a wide variety of services to the Abacha regime. The services included espionage on pro-democracy activists and the murder of the regime’s real or perceived enemies.” The source said that the assassination of Mr. Alfred Rewane, a financier and backer of the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), was “Ibori’s most notable hit.” Mr. Rewane was killed in 1995 at his home in GRA Ikeja, a suburb of Lagos. The source also stated that Ibori participated in the killing of General Shehu Musa Yar’adua (rtd). The late Yar’adua was reportedly injected with the blood of a member of Abacha’s dreaded Strike Force/BG member who died of AIDS shortly after returning from training in Libya and Ibori sacrificed his newspaper editor, Niran Malaolu to one of Abacha's phantom coup trials that earned him life imprisonment until Abacha died.

The US district court documents suggest that Ibori was reaping the reward of his membership of Abacha’s killer squad after he met Hamza Al Mustapha, Abacha’s Chief Security Officer.

In an “affidavit in support of arrest in rem” sworn to by USSS agent, Eddie L. Coulter, it was revealed that Ibori began receiving huge sums of money into a Citibank account he opened in the last quarter of 1994, when Abacha began recruiting civilian assassins to serve his regime. The affidavit discloses that the big sum that triggered the forfeiture proceedings took place in 1996 when the sum of $1.5 million was wired to Ibori’s Citibank account. In court papers obtained by Saharareporters, US investigators laid out a case that Ibori’s stunning deposits were the proceeds of some 419 activities. They revealed that, prior to making the amazing transfers, Ibori and his wife, Theresa Nakanda, lived in England in assisted public housing. Both Ibori and his wife were receiving public assistance at the time that the inexplicable money transfers started flowing into his CitiBank accounts.

Caught in the crosshairs of American law enforcement, Ibori wangled documents with the help of the Abacha regime claiming that the monies came from legitimate sources. In court documents, he claimed part of the deposits came from payments from a debt collection he undertook for a company that was owed huge sums of money by the ministry of petroleum resources as well as Nigeria's minsitry of finance.

Our investigation showed that the Abacha regime went out of its way to assist Ibori in building a deceptive case that the astonishing deposits came from legitimate business dealings. Despite those false declarations, US court documents show that American investigators forced Ibori to forfeit part of the deposits as a penalty. 

Ibori’s suspicious use of different dates to obtain driver’s licenses in Maryland and later Virginia drew the attention of the US secret service.

When shown the asset forfeiture papers, two Nigerian security sources, including a member of the Special Investigation Panel (SIP) that once interrogated Ibori over mysterious Abacha-era assassinations, told Saharareporters that the court documents were the missing link in their inquiry, which eventually nabbed Al Mustapha, Ibori’s close business associate during the Abacha years.


Nigerian security agents, serving and retired, who spoke to us indicated that the security agencies were well aware of Ibori’s extensive participation in the tight-knit network of the Abacha regime’s hideous security apparatus that was responsible for a series of assassinations, disappearances and the frame-up of notable pro-democracy activists in Nigeria between 1993 and 1998. Abacha was working to transmute from a dictator to an “elected” president when he died suddenly in 1998 in mysterious circumstances.

Col. Ibrahim Yakassai, a military doctor who helped inject Shehu Musa Yar’adua (the elder brother of current Nigeria ruler, Umaru Yar’adua) with the AIDS-contaminated blood of a dead BG member, told the Special Investigation Panel (SIP) that investigated Abacha-era killings and corruption that a good deal of monies stolen in the name of “security votes” went to Ibori who maintained strong business dealings with Al Mustapha. Col. (Dr.) Yakassai was the head of the murderous special force known as the “BG”.

In the words of one of our highly knowledgeable security sources, “Colonel Yakassai did confess to the SIP that some of the money the General Abdulsalami Abubakar regime accused him of embezzling was given to Ibori to finance "The Diet" newspaper which was co-owned by Ibori and Major Hamza Mustapha.”

Saharareporters checks shows that Diet newspaper was registered on October 10 1996 as “Diet Communications Limited”. Ibori and Hadi Hamza, a brother of Al Mustapha’s, were listed as the major shareholders in the company whose registration number with the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) was 301608.

Hadi Hamza represented the interests of Abacha’s chief security aide.

A member of the SIP gave Saharareporters a chilling account of the way Abacha’s team of assassins “exterminated General Yar’adua.” According to him, “Major Hamza Al Mustapha, James Ibori and Ibrahim Yakassai met in Abuja on the orders of General Abacha to find a final solution to Shehu Yar’adua’s intransigence. After the team met, they opted to send a special operations team to Port Harcourt. The team was led by Hamza Mustapha.

General Shehu Yar’adua was then in Port Harcourt prison, they moved him to a guesthouse in Port Harcourt where he was injected with a concoctionhe was later transported to Enugu prison  and later to Abakaliki prison.”

The source said the fluid contained the contaminated blood of a Strike Force BG trainee who fell ill in Libya and was rushed home to the State House Clinic in Abuja where he died of AIDS. The dead operative’s blood was drawn and flown on a presidential jet to Port Harcourt with the team that went to kill Yar’adua. The elder Yar’adua died 7 months later. 

Several security sources told Saharareporters that the Yar’adua family was responsible for blocking public disclosure of the way the general was finished off. “Because of the AIDS angle to (the general’s) death, his family, including President Yar’adua, stopped further prosecution of the case,” said one source.

“They considered the cause of his death too embarrassing to be revealed to the public. Another source told Saharareporters that “President” Yar’adua was working quietly to, “very shortly,” arrange the release of Hamza Mustapha. Al Mustapha has been standing trial in Lagos for his role in the attempted assassination of Mr. Alex Ibru, publisher of the Guardian stable of newspapers.

The court handling the former CSO’s case is being pressured to quietly use a technicality to set Abacha’s hit man free.

A top politician familiar with the internal intrigues within the Yar’adua family told Saharareporters that Ibori’s closeness to Umaru Yar’adua indicated “the often hidden depths of Umaru’s hatred for his elder brother.” The source said Yar’adua was clearly aware of Ibori’s role in the team that ended his brother’s life.

In another interesting twist, Yar’adua’s wife, Turai, is “an extremely close friend of Miriam Abacha,” the late dictator’s widow. Miriam Abacha was conspicuously present at the wedding of “President” Yar’adua’s daughter to Governor Isah Yuguda of Bauchi. She presided over the cake-cutting ceremony at the wedding. By contrast, Binta Yar’adua, wife of the late general, was not seen at the wedding. Our source said that Shehu Yar’adua’s family has limited access to his younger brother’s regime and family.

One of Ibori’s longstanding friends told Saharareporters that the former Delta governor “is a survivalist who knows how to cozy up to family members of those he helped to deal with.” As earlier reported by Saharareporters, Ibori established a curious friendship with Ebisan Rewane, the son of Pa Rewane.

He lavishly enriched the younger Rewane, nominating him as a member of some of his shadow companies.

Sources within the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) as well as agents of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission told Saharareporters that Ibori invested close to N16 billion in Umaru Yar’adua’s presidential campaigns in 2006/2007.

Ibori, whose official birth date is 1958, claimed that he was born on two different dates in 1962, according to an affidavit by the special US agent who investigated his cash deposits. The affidavit is reproduced below:


AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ARREST IN REM


1.    I am a Special Agent with the United States Secret Service and have been so employed since 1993. I am currently assigned to the Secret Service Washington metro Alien Fraud Task Force (MAFTF), a multi-agency fraud task force investigating organized alien fraud groups.

As a member of this task force, I regularly investigate financial schemes perpetrated by alien groups against victims located in the metropolitan Washington D.C. area and throughout the world. I have worked numerous large scale fraud cases involving organized Nigerian groups.


2.    Because of the numerous cases worked against Nigerian groups, I know that in one particular scheme, individuals from the Republic of Nigeria attempt to steal money from individuals and corporations, using an “Advance Fee” fraud scheme. The host promises payment in the form of wire transfers of large amounts of money, e.g. $60,000,000 identified as “over-invoiced” contract money which, rather than returning it to the Nigerian Government, the host desires to transfer the money to a foreign account to be shared by all parties. The “investors” typically receive a fax outlining the “surplus funds,” and may even be told that the plan is specifically designed to keep the money out of the hands of the Nigerian Government. 


3.    In the beginning, the host requires no money up front. Gradually, the host will request that certain “fees” be paid in order to facilitate the transfer of the money, which the host will usually increase, justifying the additional fees as part of the “investment.”


4.    The common theme in all of the schemes is the promise of millions of dollars in return for a “minor” investment, which is usually increased over time depending on the victim’s ability to pay. These fees are usually explained as taxes, telecommunication fees and expenses incurred by the host, which must be paid in “advance” in relationship to the entire transaction. The transaction, of course, never takes place.


5.    Generally, the investor makes an initial payment and the host continues to obtain additional “advance fees,” explaining away additional fees until the investor begins to question the legitimacy of the deal. The host then discontinues any further contact and the investor loses whatever money he has paid

.
6.    During 1995, the United States Secret Service received approximately 3,250 different letters from businesses throughout the United States regarding letters using the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) as a “front.” This scheme entices the business to assist Nigerians in the transfer of excessive contract funds to offshore accounts. This fraud scheme uses bogus, counterfeit and false, faxed documents displaying the Central Bank of Nigeria letterhead and stamp. In every case the investor wires money to bank accounts to “facilitate” the transfer of these funds, and the money is never seen again.


7.    This fraud has been classified by the Secret Service as “4-1-9” fraud. The “4-1-9” is derived from the provision of the Nigerian Criminal Code, which prohibits any scheme designed to defraud the Nigerian government and denies certain government sanctions, including restitution, to any individual who participates in the fraud, including “investors” who invest in such schemes.


8.    When contacted by the United States Secret Service, the NNPC confirmed that it is a legitimate corporation and NNPC does not deal with clients in the manner outlined in the scheme. NNPC representatives stated that there are organized criminal elements who represent themselves as members of NNPC in an attempt to execute fraud schemes. NNPC stated that there are no special rates, registration or licensing fees associated with their business transactions, and all of their transactions are conducted through the Crude Oil Marketing Division and not the Central Bank of Nigeria, where numerous fraudulent initiation letters originate.


9.    In summing up the “Advance Fee, 4-1-9” fraud scheme, it can be described as a very large-scale international “film flam” operation, involving numerous banking institutions. The scheme involves numerous wire transfers of large amounts of money through various national and international financial institutions. This scheme almost always utilizes faxed counterfeit and/or false documents, etc., which ultimately results in the theft of money from the corporation or individual investor.


10.    In all cases, the “investor” is aware that he is engaging in a questionable investment at best. These investors are located throughout the world, including the United States. The 4-1-9 conspirators also maintain residences throughout the world. They also maintain bank accounts in numerous financial institutions, including the State of Maryland and Prince Georgia’s County, Maryland, which is the subject of the Affidavit.


11.    On or about October 20, 1994, James O. Ibori opened a CitiBank/CitiGold account (#52001013) at Branch number 734, 822 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. At the time Ibori opened the account, he claimed he was self employed as an “International Policy Analyst/Consultant.” The information provided to CitiBank/CitiGold was a London address – 3 Athelsto N.E., Harrow, Wealdstone, Great Britain HA3SV; Date of Birth – 06/08/62; Social Security Number 703-960-0835. Since the opening of this account, Ibori’s average balance ranged from approximately $1,000.00 to as much as $15,000.00.


12.    On or about November 29, 1996, according to CitiBank Investigators, Ibori received an incoming wire transfer of approximately $1,500,000.00 into his CitiBank account (#52001013) from an undisclosed customer at RAHN & BODMER Bank located in Zurich, Switzerland. Around that same time, Ibori also received an incoming wire transfer of approximately $250,000.00 into the same account. Both incoming transfers named James Ibori as the beneficiary. 


13.    On or about December 3, 1996, Ibori contacted CitiBank/CitiGold and provided instructions to disburse $500,000.00 to BARCLAYS BANK INTERNATIONAL SERVICES (London), account # 88309199. The beneficiary of that account was James Ibori.


14.    That same day, Ibori also provided instructions to CitiBank/CitiGold to disburse an additional $5,000.00 to BARCLAYS BANK (HARBOR BAY BRANCH-Nassau, Bahamas), account #1128186. The beneficiary of that account was James Ibori.


15.    On December 4, 1996, Ibori instructed CitiBank/CitiGold to disburse $50,000.00 to CITIZENS INTERNATIONAL BANK LTD (London), account number 439203947. The beneficiary of that account was James Ibori.


16.    On or about that same day, CitiBank/CitiGold files a Suspicious Activity Report regarding the incoming $1.5 million, and outgoing $500,000.00, $50,000.00 and $5,000.00 wire transfers from Ibori’s account (#52001013). The report was subsequently forwarded to the MATF, U.S. Secret Service, Washington, D.C.


17.    On December 6, 1996, I received the Suspicious Activity Report that was filed by CitiBank/CitiGold. I also was informed by CitiBank/CitiGold that, earlier that day, Ibori had attempted to disburse additional funds via wire. Ibori told the CitiBank/CitiGold representative that he was calling from Hyatt Hotel in London and provided three telephone numbers where he could be reached: 01123412610578, 01123495231811 (room 1076), and 01123490400911 (cell phone).

When representatives of Citibank/CitiGold called the telephone number for the “hotel” in London, an individual answered and claimed that Ibori had checked out earlier that day. Investigation revealed that the telephone numbers were, in fact, telephone numbers located within the country of Lagos, Nigeria and not London, England. 
18.    That same day, CitiBank/CitiGold representative questioned Ibori about the $1,500,000.00 incoming wire transfer. Ibori said that the money was for unspecified work that he had been doing for the past nine months.
19.   

Later on December 6, 1996, Special Agent (SA) Hupp, MAFTF, called the Virginia telephone number (703-960-0835). An answering machine responded with a voice that identified itself as James Ibori. The telephone number was unlisted.


20.    On December 9, 1996, I called RAHN and BODMER Bank and spoke with Christian Rahn, Partner and Legal Representative. I informed him of the Suspicious Activity Report that was filed by CitiBank/CitiGold. I requested that he contact the customer that wired the $1,500,000.00 to Ibori’s CitiBank/CitiGold account (#52001013). I also requested that he (Rahn) inquire of the customer the circumstance under which the money was wired to Ibori. Rahn agreed that he would do so.


21.    That same day, I contacted SA James Gallagher, U.S. Secret Service, London Resident Office. I provided SA Gallagher the London address of Ibori, 3 Athlesto N.E., Harrow, Wealdstone, Great Britain HA3SV, and Date of Birth, 06/08/62, to verify the information that Ibori provided to CitiBank/CitiGold.


22.    A query of the Department of Motor Vehicle records, within Washington, D.C.-Metropolitan area revealed that Ibori, in order to obtain states’ of Virginia and Maryland Driver’s Licenses, used a different date of birth, 08/04/62, from what was provided to CitiBank/CitiGold when his account was opened. Sometime in April 1996, Ibori obtained a state of Virginia’s Driver’s license, address 6040 Richmond Highway, Apt. #607, Alexandria, VA 22303. Ibori, in February 1993, also obtained a state of Maryland Driver’s License, address 12630 Viers Mill Rd., Apt. 1503, Rockville, Maryland 20853.


23.    On December 10, 1996, I received a call from SA Gallagher. SA Gallagher informed me that Ibori did, in fact, reside at 3 Athelso N.E., Harrow, Wealdstone, great Britain HA3SV with a wife or girlfriend, Theresa Nakanda, and a two year old child. SA Gallagher also informed me that criminal history check in London revealed that Nakanda had been arrested for theft in 1992. At the time of her arrest, she was accompanied by an individual who identified himself as “James Obori.” SA Gallagher also informed me that the location where Ibori resided was a Public Housing Community, In addition, SA Gallagher stated that Ibori, according to the British public housing authorities, had been unemployed and receiving public assistance/unemployment benefits.


24.    Later that day, Ibori contacted CitiBank/CitiGold and provided instructions for several outgoing wire transactions to be sent from his CitiBank/CitiGold account (#52001013):
1.    $100,000 to CITIZENS INTERNATIONAL LTD (London), account 439203947. The beneficiary of that account was James Ibori. 
2.    $500,000 to Meryll lynch (NY), I.D. #141760/Subaccount # 116-11037. The beneficiary of that account was James Ibori.
3.    $300,000 and $200,000, on separate occasions, to CitiBank/CitiGold Mutual Fund Investment account #52001013. The beneficiary of that account was James Ibori,
4.    $50,000 to GUARANTY TRUST BANK, account # 664276. The beneficiary of that account was Lateef Belo-Osagie.


25.    On December 11, 1996, I spoke with Christian Rahn, Partner and Legal Representative of Rahn and Bodmer Bank in Zurich, Switzerland. Rahn stated that he had been in contact with the customer’s representative. Rahn stated that the customer had entered into a “contractual agreement” with Ibori regarding a debt collection on an oil contract. Rahn also stated that the customer was under the impression that the monies, wired to Ibori, were “fees” or payment for the “services” rendered by Ibori.


26.    As a result of this investigation, I have discovered many of the elements that are indicative of the “Advance Fee” fraud scheme. Ibori, a non-citizen (Nigerian), in 1994, opened an account (#52001013) CitiBank, Rockville, Maryland using a London address, and Virginia’s driver’s license. At the time Ibori opened his account, he claimed he was an “International Policy Analyst” when, in fact, he appears to have been unemployed and was receiving unemployment benefits in London. In addition, since the opening of Ibori’s account, his average balance, through November 1996, has been approximately $10,000.00. Since the approximate dates of 11/29/96 through 12/10/96, Ibori has received and disbursed approximately $1,750,000.00 into other foreign and domestic accounts whereby Ibori has been the beneficiary.


27.    On December 13, 1997, I obtained seizure warrants from a U.S. Magistrate Judge for three bank accounts whereby James Ibori was the beneficiary:
1.    $500,000.00, Meryll Lynch (NY), I.D. #141760/ Subaccount # 116-11037.
2.    $300,000.00 and $200,000.00, CitiBanl/CitiGold Mutual Fund Investment, account #52001013.
3.    $500,000.00, BARCLAYS BANK INTERNATIONAL SERVICES (London), account # 88309199.


28.    Between the dates of December 13-20, 1997, I retrieved the total sum of $1,019,000.40 from the above-mentioned accounts (#’s 1. & 2.)


29.    To the present, your affiant has been unsuccessful in obtaining the necessary supporting documents (i.e. contractual agreement and etc.) from Ibori or the unidentified disburser of the funds seized.


30.    Based on my training, knowledge, and experience, this type of wire transfer activity is indicative of the advance fee fraud scheme. The scheme resulted in part in the wire transfer of $1,500,000.00 into the CitiBank/CitiGold Account #52001013 listed in the name of James O. Ibori. I believe that Ibori, through many counts of misrepresentation, has, under false pretenses, obtained monies and used domestic foreign financial institutions to facilitate this “Advance Fee” fraud scheme. 


31.    By reason of the foregoing, I believe the defendant monies were involved in transactions in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956 and/or 1957 or are traceable to monies involved in such transactions, and are therefore forfeitable to the United States of America pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 981.






___________________________


Eddie L. Colter, Jr.,
United States Secret Service

 Registered users can download the entire court documents at the E-Library

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