Saharareporters has exclusively obtained the names of “prominent” Nigerians in the so-called "Tom Polo's lists" found by the Joint Task Force (JTF) during their attacks on Camp 5, Tom Polo's base in Gbaramatu Kingdom near Warri, Delta State. In addition, our investigative team has also secured a secret document that would form the basis of Umaru Yar'adua's so-called “amnesty” program that may be announced next week.
The documents emanated from the Godwin Abbe panel set up to work out the details of amnesty for Niger Delta militants.
The names on Tom Polo’s list include former Delta State governor, James Ibori, usurper “Vice President” Goodluck Jonathan, Governor Emmanuel Uduaghan of Delta, former Governor Diepreye S.P. Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa, former secretary to the Delta State Government, Ovie Omo-Agege (who was linked to Tom Polo over the Baco liner hostage crisis), former Chief of Army staff, Owoye Andrew Azazi, and current Minister for Special Duties to Yar'adua, Godsday Orubebe.
A senior Presidency source told Saharareporters that the Yar’adua regime was reluctant to release the list because “the government sees the names as a ‘visitors register’ that Tom Polo kept of big guns who visited his camp to pay homage or negotiate with him sometimes on behalf of Yar'adua.” He added that the list also contains names of undercover agents from the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), the Joint Task Force (JTF) and State Security Service (SSS) whose identity cannot be exposed to the public.
However, the "amnesty" document (see below) gives the impression that the names of Tom Polo's backers may be released and the indicted persons also offered amnesty.
RE; REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PANEL ON AMNESTY AND DISARMAMENT OF MILITANTS IN THE NIGER DELTA
INTRODUCTION
1. Amnesty to combatants has remained one of the most effective tools to end conflicts, promote reconciliation and prevent re-ignition. It is on this strength that Mr President inaugurated a Panel on amnesty for the militants in the Niger Delta region. The panel was essentially tasked to prepare a framework for amnesty and disarmament, demobilization and re-integration (DDR); ensure those with criminal record do not take advantage of it; and work out the cost of implication DDR.
2. The Panel’s report adequately addressed all the relevant issues in its report but stressed that the strategy advocated is neither perfect nor exhaustive but tailored to the Nigerian situation. The Panel further opined that the report would be useful to the judiciary, legislators and other tiers of government. This write-up will make attempt at bringing out the high points discussed with additional inputs by way of comments, hence it is not a summary.
CHAPTER 1: AMNESTY
3. The report stated that “Amnesty” is not mentioned in the constitution, but however empowers the President to grant pardon to any person concerned/convicted of any offence. These include those who have committed offence but not prosecuted, and those who have been prosecuted and convicted of offences. The Panel posited that all categories of militants should be allowed to benefit from the amnesty. This should include Henry Okah and his group who are only facing trial but not yet convicted.
4. Amnesty goes beyond pardon as it completely obliterates all legal remembrance of the offence. Contextually, amnesty has been defined as a legislative or executive act by which a state restores those who may have been guilty of offences against it to a position of innocence. The Panel stressed that not withstanding the absence of the word “amnesty” in the constitution, the President can grant a reprieve that would operate as amnesty.
5. According to the Panel, amnesty may be used to bring citizens into compliance with the law rather than punishing them for violation of same. Apart from encouraging the combatants to reconcile with the society, amnesty also avoid expensive prosecutions especially when it involves large number of people. As stated earlier, the panel is of the opinion that all categories of militants should be granted the amnesty including those undergoing criminal prosecution. This will serve to encourage every militant to participate and remove any fear of hidden agenda or discrimination. Consequently, the Panel suggested that state governors should be given the tasks of compiling the list of militants seeking Mr President’s amnesty. This should also be forwarded to the Honourable Minister of Justice and Attorney General of the Federation.
6. The Panel also stressed the need for Mr President to make a proclamation to the nation by way of a presidential broadcast. The panel included a draft proclamation as an annex of the report. A period of 60 – 75 days was suggested for combatants to renounce militancy.
7. Modalities for establishing a strong database of ex-militants was also discussed. Details of each ex-militant such as name, age, qualification, locality, reasons for resorting to militancy, how he/she was employed in the group, what he/she intends to do in future etc will be documented.
COMMENTS
8. The Panel was given 3 Terms of Reference (TOR) wherein the second TOR states that “to ensure that those with criminal records do not take advantage of the amnesty”. This may be misconstrued to mean anybody with criminal background should not be included. In any case the beneficiaries of the amnesty are mainly those with criminal records. This should be noted only as the Panel did not make attempt to exclude anybody in the package.
9. While keeping in focus the aim of the amnesty (as discussed by the Panel) the issue of Mr Henry Okah deserves some mention. In relation to his case, some soldiers have been court marshaled and are now facing various sentences in jail. If Okah is to be granted amnesty, it should be made clear that this will be of no benefit to the soldiers. The possibility that lawyers or politicians could be sponsored to call for a reduced sentence or amnesty to the soldiers must be anticipated.
10. It is pertinent to note that Sogboma George was in Portharcourt awaiting trial for the broad day light murder of one Golden Kalio (Ateke Tom’s so called 2i/c) at Lagos bus stop in 2005. He eventually organized a bloody jail break before escaping. It is possible that the families of the victim could see these as injustice if he is granted amnesty. However, the benefit of granting amnesty to everybody is well underscored in the Panel’s report. Also following the recent incursion into Camp 5, the involvement of some members of the security forces became apparent. If there is a well established case that could warrant prosecution, it should be clear that the amnesty package will not involve such characters.
11. The period of 60 – 75 days for renunciation could be scaled down to a period of 21 – 30 days for the following reasons:
a. A longer period of renunciation could avail a calmer environment for those not fully committed to move and hide weapons as once the proclamation is made, the tempo of JTF operations will reduce.
b. In this era of telecommunications and the massive media campaign organized by the Panel, it is given that 21 – 30 days is well adequate for anybody to be fully educated on the amnesty. In fact, even now after the takeover of Camp 5, most of the militants are apprehensive and hoping for the amnesty.
c. It is also given that a reduced period will reduce the herculean financial/logistical implications.
d. After the initial period of 21 – 30 days, ex-militants can be moved for rehabilitation outside the region, while the JTF will be tasked to route out all those not willing to drop arms.
12. In line with the UN Article on Conflict Resolution, there should be a commitment on the part of government to grant amnesty with a reciprocal commitment by combatants to disarm. In the case of Niger Delta, if some pockets of bandits, do not embrace the peace process, then the JTF must be allowed to quickly go after them. Government must declare a zero tolerance for militancy as due to the peculiarity of the region, militancy is a quick way of making money (especially in illegal bunkering and hostages taking).
13. The Panel opined that State governors are to compile list of militants willing to disarm. This should however not be encouraged as some states governors are known to have issues (either as foes or friends) to some militants. They could become partisans. It is therefore suggested that a channel of communication should be considered directly with the militants and the proposed committee on DDR.
CHAPTER 2: DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILISATION
14. Disarmament and demobilization can only be achieved when sources and means of arms procurement have been severed from the militants. The Panel noted the close correlation between armed conflict in the Niger Delta and illegal oil bunkering. To this end, the Panel stressed the need for the Nigerian Navy to be adequately empowered in terms of platform acquisition to effectively stop illegal bunkering. Equally stressed was the need for the JTF to be empowered to control proliferation of light weapons before and after proclamation.
15. The report recommended a wide media campaign that will engage leaders of thought, mass public enlightenment and international organizations. NGOs will be engaged but only after screening. Religious bodies will not be left out equally.
16. It was suggested that the FGN should establish an Inter-agency Coordinating Centre (ICC) at Enugu to coordinate all the agencies in the disarmament process. Enugu was chosen as ICC because of the need to have the centre slightly away from the zone of the militants, it is centrally placed in the region and operates an airport, thus facilitating transportation. The Panel also called on the FGN to define the task of each participating agency, and seek the support of the UN.
17. The concept of disarmament should be the return of arms for full rehabilitation and freedom from prosecution. “Arms for money” concept must never be entertained. Screening points are to be established in all the states of the Niger Delta.
18. Close to screening points, arms collection points are to be established (close to military installations). The Nigerian Army Ordinance Corps in collaboration with DICON staff could be used to examine and document recovered arms as opined by the Panel.
COMMENTS
19. The Armed Forces and the Police have over the years lost several weapons to militants in the Niger Delta during shootouts. Some weapons were equally pilfered from the armories as well. It is therefore suggested that the Armed Forces and the Police should provide a data of all weapons lost in the Niger Delta. Among the details to be included are type, serial number, location taken from, how it was misplaced etc. The detail should then be circulated to all the arms collection centre with the hope that such weapons could be traced and if possible returned to their parent armouries.
CHAPTER 3: PUBLICITY AND LIAISON
20. The Panel recognized the importance of perception management so as to influence the hearts and mind of all militants and the general public towards the programme. It also discussed the need to counter any possible propaganda that may be mounted. Accordingly, the uses of posters, jingles and songs, town hall meetings, creating of websites will be employed to achieve adequate publicity. To counter any propaganda, press statements and conferences will be issued on regular basis. In essences, the main effort will be to saturate the consciousness of every Nigerian, through every means possible to ensure that the expectations and outcome of the process are communicated to all so that no one can claim ignorance of what the FGN is doing.
21. The Panel proposed Dr.Timiebi Koripamo Agary as Chief Spokesperson with Hon. Dafe Akpedeye, SAN as the alternate spokesperson.
22. While noting the budgetary provision for placement of adverts, the Panel request for the NTA and FRCN to air this free or at a highly discounted rates.
CHAPTER 4: RE-INTEGRATION
23. It was observed that Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of ex militants form a continuum that is itself a part of the entire peace process. It therefore follows that reintegration programme can over-lap with long term peace building initiatives and some activities should start at the early stage in the peace making process.
24. The framework for reintegration shall include rehabilitation of 20,000 ex militants for a projected period of 3 months. The proposed rehabilitation centers are Plateau, Adamawa, Taraba, Kwara, Lagos, Enugu and Cross Rivers States. The FGN was advised to expedite action on the Local Content Bill to be passed by the National Assemply as soon as possible. The need to create a Presidential Standing Committee on DDR was also discussed.
COMMENTS
25. Cross Rivers State is the only rehabilitation centre close to the (or within) crisis area. This may pose some security challenge. It should be noted that rehabilitation centers could serve as recruitment centers for militants or other subversive elements. This is moreso as militants have carried out attacks around Bakassi Peninsula to show their disagreement on the peaceful settlement of the crisis between Nigeria and Cameroon. There is also the need to involve the NDLEA activity in all rehabilitation centers as such places could become hard drug hotspots.
26. On a general note, one of the driving force that has brought about the Niger Delta crisis is the feeling of neglect (whether real or imaginary) by the people of the area. The peaceful and non violent genuine struggle for resources control was along the way hijacked by criminal elements. It is therefore imperative for the FGN to show the political goodwill to pursue this peace process to a logical conclusion by critically considering who should head the Presidential Committee on DDR and its members whilst not promoting or castigating any person proposed by government, the following may be considered.
a. The head of the committee/members must have a means of having direct link with the people at the grassroots.
b. The head of the committee should if possible have an international recognition as an advocate of non-violence.
c. Someone of Ijaw ethnic extraction may be preferable as about 70% of the militants and camps are in Ijaw lands.
d. Members of the committee must be taken based on the practical challenge of the task.
e. The head of the committee should be someone who has no much commitment at the national level, as such he should be within the Niger Delta or rehabilitation centers for most of the duration of the exercise.
27. While trying to draw lessons from the UN, it should be noted that in the recent past, the NDDC has rehabilitated a sizeable number of ex militants in Lagos. It is expected that the FGN should have encouraged that by expanding the scope and funding it. It is therefore desirable for the FGN to carryout a quick assessment on how successful the NDDC exercise was. How many militants were rehabilitated, how was it done and did anybody ever go back to the criminality after rehabilitation. In the final analysis, studying and improving the NDDC blueprint could save time, money and ultimately help eradicate the problem of restiveness in the Niger Delta. This is also bearing in mind that an accelerated development of the region will be carried out as soon as progress is made in the peace process.
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