I do not think that Mr Nwoko actually read, as he claimed, the responses and commentaries of some of his Igbo compatriots in this debate. Most of these commentaries that I have come across appear to be from people who are yet to clear their head and minds of the propaganda of war. What some of them choose to believe and regurgitate are mind bogglingly pedestrian. But, be that as it may be.
I do not think that Mr Nwoko actually read, as he claimed, the responses and commentaries of some of his Igbo compatriots in this debate. Most of these commentaries that I have come across appear to be from people who are yet to clear their head and minds of the propaganda of war. What some of them choose to believe and regurgitate are mind bogglingly pedestrian. But, be that as it may be.
The problem here lies with the different reader perceptions of what Achebe said. Understandably, the author's perception of what Achebe said is that Achebe separates Awolowo’s actions and intents from that of his Yoruba followership; and he did not equate the man Awolowo to his race, the Yorubas.
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However, to others, especially the Yorubas, the link, if only implicitly and subtly made, between Awolowo’s actions and its intention of giving the Yorubas an unfair advantage at the expense of the Igbos, was not lost on them. The Yorubas have a proverb, which runs thus: delicate and sensitive messages are conveyed to the wise and decent man in parables; it is then left for him to receive, internalise and reflect on the message, in order to fully understand it.
Awolowo went into Gowon’s war cabinet just like any other Nigerian on that cabinet did. Yes, he is a Yoruba man who was called upon to serve his country in war time capacity so why associate his suggestions and actions on that war cabinet with his desire to get an advantage for his own people, who never elected or nominated him to serve on that cabinet? Why not see Awolowo as any other Nigerian on that cabinet, called to serve their country at a time of national emergency and on whom it was incumbent to contribute their own quota to the war effort and defend collective decisions? Achebe is someone who had written extensively about the leadership deficit in Nigeria, hence why would he now choose to lay blame for the actions of the war cabinet at the doorstep of Chief Awolowo? Certainly, the war cabinet and the Federal Government at that time, had only one address, which was at Dodan Barracks, and it was definitely not at Oke Ado ( Ibadan) or Ikenne. In any case, people speak through their leaders, especially those leaders that they trust. Hence, the distinction that the author is trying to make is not quite on.
Achebe is certainly a master of the written word and he fully well knows the impression he intends to convey, at least to, his Yoruba readership. This is what commentators object to. Yorubas believe in the spirit of live and let live and do not need to eliminate other peoples to survive or thrive. Evidence of this abounds in the fact that the dogged and hardworking Igbo business man has thrived, unmolested, pre and post the civil war in Yoruba land. To the extent that he now owns and controls a large share of the small and medium scale businesses all over Yoruba land , without anyone begrudging or touching him up for doing so. Where else in Nigeria has a non-indigene, Igbo politician been elected to the office of the Speaker of a State House of Assembly?
It is a fact of history that Chief Awolowo was the Vice Chairman of Gowon’s war cabinet that used a blockade as a weapon of war and Chief Awolowo, probably in line with his responsibility on that cabinet, and also in the spirit of collective responsibility, came out to defend the actions of that cabinet, ugly as its consequences turned out to be. Hence, when the author requests for an alternative interpretation to Achebe’s rather patronising and untrue impressions of Chief Awolowo’s motives, I say that Chief Awolowo was a member of a war cabinet that had a war to fight and win and the cabinet simply used what it saw as “legitimate” means within its control to fight the war. That the blockade ended up hitting non-combatants most was indeed unfortunate, unacceptable and indeed the ugly face of modern warfare, where a disproportionately high casualty figure tend to be recorded among the often vulnerable non-combatant population. And, they call it “collateral damage”. This is even more so, when one or both warring parties enter into the war unprepared. Although Achebe attempted to minimise the fact that the blockade would not have been as bad as it turned out to be, when he fleetingly referred to the reasons for Ojukwo’s rejection of the Federal Government offer of the opening of a mercy land corridor as a moot point; however, since this debate started facts have since emerged to the effect that after the rejection of an offer of the opening of a mercy land corridor for relief supplies, to be supervised by the International Red Cross and World Council of Churches, among others; the Federal Government was prepared to meet General Ojukwu on his own terms, provided that he was willing to give assurances that relief flights would not be used as a means of importing arms (see: http://premiumtimesng.com/news/103624-u-s-blames-ojukwu-gowon-for-biafras-starvation-deaths.html ). But, General Ojukwu refused to give this assurance. General Ojukwu’s recalcitrance over the acceptance of the FG’s offer of a mercy land corridor to feed starving Biafran civilians was to cost him the loss of Biafra’s Public Relations Representative in the United States, Robert Goldstein, who reportedly resigned in protest at General Ojukwu’s action (see: http://www.dawodu.com/omoigui27.htm).
If indeed we grant Achebe, and his apologists, their “impressions” that this “powerful” and “vengeful” politician “..Awolowo was driven by an overriding ambition for power, for himself and for his Yoruba people…”, to the extent that he was willing to hatch a “…diabolical policy to reduce the numbers of his enemies significantly through starvation – eliminating over two million people, mainly members of future generations.”; the question to ask is whether, or not, good judgment, pragmatism and tact could not have prevailed on the Biafran side to avoid the impending catastrophe? Sadly, and very sadly too, this was not to be the case, as can be seen from the seminal writings of Dr Nowa Omoigui, on the Nigerian Civil war, which are (available at: http://www.dawodu.com/omoigui.htm). One aspect pertinent to this argument thread is cited, in part, below.
“... At the OAU meeting that took place in Algiers on September 13th {1968}, Nigeria won a diplomatic victory when the continental body passed a pro-Nigerian resolution basically declaring its opposition to secession.
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The Biafran delegation to the meeting, consisting of recognized figures like Nnamdi Azikiwe, Michael Okpara, Kenneth Dike, Francis Nwokedi and others subsequently conducted a crucial meeting with the French observer delegation from Foccart’s office { Foccart was Secretary-General of the Franco-African Community}. They wanted France to agree to an unrestrained military commitment to Biafra, in which enough weapons to assure victory over Nigeria, would be supplied, rather than just enough to defend the core of Biafra against Nigeria’s “Operation Tall Man”, Gowon’s final offensive of 1968. The French delegation refused, and stipulated that they would not increase the current level of commitment unless Biafra was able to independently attract additional diplomatic recognition from more African countries. It was a Catch-22 situation.
It was on this basis, therefore, that the Biafran OAU observer delegation in Algiers (except Nwokedi, who dissented) sent a cable back to Emeka Ojukwu in Biafra. They advised that in view of the recent fall of Aba and Owerri, and French ambivalence, Biafra – faced with large numbers of starving people - should negotiate a peaceful end to the crisis by responding to Nigeria’s offer of guarantees and re-integration of Igbos. Ojukwu’s reaction, however, was to accuse them all of treason and order the delegation to return home at once. This was the point at which Ojukwu parted ways with long-standing Igbo politicians like Azikiwe and Okpara. A follow-up letter sent from Paris on September 25th by Nnamdi Azikiwe to persuade Ojukwu to negotiate – in order to save lives - was also rebuffed. A few days later, on September 27th, to outflank the old political warhorse, Ojukwu convened his appointed Biafran Consultative Assembly and got a “mandate” to keep fighting”. (see: http://www.dawodu.com/omoigui27.htm )
Furthermore, in a display of callous insensitivity to the plight of their own people, an unnamed Biafran Army Officer reportedly told British Journalist, John de St. Jorre that:
“If you gave us the choice of 1000 rifles or milk for 50,000 starving children, we’d take the guns.” (See: http://www.dawodu.com/omoigui27.htm )
From the sources that I have cited above, one can deduce that: during the Nigerian Civil War, the Federal Government imposed a blockade on the secessionist enclave of Biafra. This blockade led to widespread starvation among the civilian populace of Biafra. Due to the need to relief the sufferings of the civilian populace, the FG offered General Ojukwu a land (mercy) corridor for the supply of food to his starving country men, but he rejected this offer. The mercy corridor was to be operated and supervised by international organisations. Following General Ojukwu’s rejection of the mercy land corridor, the FG acceded to his demand of the use of relief flights, on the condition that he gave assurances that such mercy flights would not be used to import arms. General Ojukwu refused to give these assurances. Prominent Biafrans and some friends of Biafra fell out with General Ojukwu over his refusal to accept the FG offer and alleviate the suffering of his own people. Any wonder therefore that starvation ravaged the Biafran population as hard as it did? Having gone to such lengths to alleviate the unintended consequences of the blockade of Biafra and meet General Ojukwu’s demands, the Federal Government does not appear to me like a side that is bent on genocide. Notwithstanding these deductions, and one again concedes that Chief Awolowo is guilty as charged, then if he were to go before the War Crimes Tribunal, he would not be the only one to do so; as, General Ojukwu and his War Cabinet were equally culpable of starving their own people too.
Let us be very clear about this, war is not a tea party; it is a nasty business that brings out the bestiality in man. It is that path, which regardless of the appeal of the solution it may promise, is better not trodden. Those who complain about the use of a blockade, as an instrument of warfare should be reminded that blockading one’s enemy is as old as war itself. The siege on Jericho, by the Israelites, was a blockade. The Allies used it during the Second World War and so did the Germans, through their U-Boat attacks on convoys in the Atlantic, carrying relief and war materials to Britain; the effect of which was general shortage and food rationing in Britain. The Biafran Army also used it in Owerri, which had a civilian population at that time (Jan. – June 1969), to rout and destroy the 16 Brigade of the Third Marine Commando Division. Post the Nigerian Civil War, several combatants have used it, among of which are, the Americans against Saddam’s Iraq and are currently using a limited version of it against Iran; as I write the Israelis are using it against Palestine, or a part of it. One is loathed to say this, but the unfortunate consequences of blockades, are just the tragic reality of war, once you decide to embark on it. Because, as Col. (as he then was) Robert Adeyinka Adebayo once observed on the eve of the Nigerian Civil War: "I need not tell you what horror, what devastation and what extreme human suffering will attend the use of force. When it is all over and the smoke and dust have lifted, and the dead are buried, we shall find, as other people have found, that it has all been futile, entirely futile, in solving the problems we set out to solve." (See: http://www.dawodu.com/omoigui12.htm).
General Ojukwu himself was to later (if only, unwittingly) concur with General Adebayo’s comments in an interview on the BBC radio programme “Biafra Revisited” (aired on 15/10/2007) in which Professor Wole Soyinka retraced his steps in the days before the war, when he went to Enugu in an attempt to convince General Ojukwu against the war.
Finally, while “factual and scholarly debates” is in order, we should not forget that these kinds of debates take place according to rules, some of which the author had already enunciated. However, another of such crucial rules is the right of reply, which every scholar should endeavour to afford their interlocutors, especially when they are professing scholarship and facts that may turn out to be controversial. I have read about the various civil war related charges levied against Chief Awolowo, but this recent one by Achebe is new to me. I therefore wonder why it is being made twenty five (25) years after the man could no longer respond to it; more especially, when the accuser had seventeen (17) years to make it and get a response?
Manchester, United Kingdom
Email: [email protected]
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