The plan to unseat the government of Mohamed Morsi through a military coup was bound to go wrong. The risk of violent escalation was always likely in a divided country where one side declined to be ruled by the Brotherhood, while the Brotherhood itself appeared apathetic to political pluralism. Far from marking the closing chapter, the coup ushered in a period of strife that could drag the country towards civil war. The army’s violence since the coup has been disastrous. When it shot scores of people on July 8th, it drew a baleful lesson from the tepid Western response: that it could get away with such brazen human rights abuses.
The plan to unseat the government of Mohamed Morsi through a military coup was bound to go wrong. The risk of violent escalation was always likely in a divided country where one side declined to be ruled by the Brotherhood, while the Brotherhood itself appeared apathetic to political pluralism. Far from marking the closing chapter, the coup ushered in a period of strife that could drag the country towards civil war. The army’s violence since the coup has been disastrous. When it shot scores of people on July 8th, it drew a baleful lesson from the tepid Western response: that it could get away with such brazen human rights abuses.
Plans to formally crush the Brotherhood – portrayed universally as ‘terrorist’ in the official media – appear to spell an end to even slim hopes for political dialogue that might potentially resolve the current impasse. The recent violence at the al-Fath mosque, and the proposal to outlaw the Brotherhood, are both more likely to further complicate and deepen the current division in the country than to herald the beginning of an end to Egypt’s crisis. Plans for the legal dissolution of the Brotherhood is likely to force it back underground and justify a crackdown that would return it to its position as a banned yet tolerated organisation during the days of deposed president Hosni Mubarak and his predecessors.
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Although it was argued that the military coup might pave the way for the ‘restoration of democracy’ to Egypt, the reality on ground is that it dealt the coup de grâce to what was a deeply flawed but still recognisably democratic period of transition, ushering in a period of spiralling violence followed by the re-imposition of Egypt’s notorious emergency law allowing military detention and undermining due process in the judiciary. Every opportunity offered to the Egyptian military to step back from the planned coup was jettisoned. Almost daily calls directly from the US Secretary of defence Chuck Hagel to General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to abandon a bloody crackdown were jettisoned as was the offer of a political strategy to break the deadlock, ironically accepted by the leadership of the Brotherhood.
This is not to say that the Brotherhood is without blame. Although it was a victim of a military coup, the Brotherhood has actively sought to validate its victimhood by treading a dangerous path that can only further arouse, rather than douse, violent confrontation. The Brotherhood shows no sign of backing down and has urged its supporters to continue taking to the streets. According to a statement released by the organisation: ‘Our rejection of the coup regime has become an Islamic, national and ethical obligation that we can never abandon.’ Likewise, each Islamist challenge is likely to strengthen those in the army arguing for further suppression.
Without an urgent demilitarisation of Egypt’s politics and withdrawal of the army from the political process, the current crisis bedevilling Egypt is likely to continue with no end in sight. Only a return to a peaceful democratic transition can bring meaningful rewards for all Egyptians. Resolving the Egyptian crisis requires an inclusive and pluralistic political process that includes all parties, including keeping the Brotherhood on the political field to guarantee their political and civil rights. Further afield, the US should cancel joint military exercises due in September and withhold its next tranche of military aid (about $1.3bn yearly) until a civilian government has been elected and assumes office. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries should not financially support the generals just because they share a mutual dislike of the Brotherhood. The two biggest organisations in Egypt are the military and the Muslim Brotherhood. Unless they both find a way of reconciling their differences in an amicable and timely way, the spectre of Algeria looms: the army there prevented Islamists from taking office after they won the first round of an election in 1991, and as many as 200,000 died in the decade-long bloodbath that ensued.
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Daniel E. Agbiboa is PhD scholar in the School of Sociology, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. His research interests are primarily in the field of conflict, security and development.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of SaharaReporters
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