The first one I encountered was titled "Is it Middle Belt or CAN Belt?" As I read it, it was clear it was misconstrued, but what puzzled me most was the absence of articles that offered factual information rather than just opinions.
When I initially became interested in the Middle Belt discussion, I decided to do some research to learn more. However, every article I found was skewed, and they all dominated the top of the search results online.
The first one I encountered was titled "Is it Middle Belt or CAN Belt?" As I read it, it was clear it was misconstrued, but what puzzled me most was the absence of articles that offered factual information rather than just opinions.
Before my journey into understanding the Middle Belt began, I often found myself bombarded with questions about the Middle Belt identity till research cleared it all up.
It wasn't until I delved into Moses Ochonu's Colonialism by Proxy and Logam's The Middle Belt Movement in Nigerian Political Development that I finally started to grasp
the eye-opening realities of the Middle Belt identity.
At that point, I could confidently say I had a clear understanding of what the Middle Belt identity and movement truly represented.
The most striking realization was the need to view the Middle Belt not through the lens of outsiders, but as it is perceived by those who belong to it.
While many of those who belong to regions outside the Middle Belt, especially those in Northern Nigeria, mistakenly label the Middle Belt as a predominantly Christian movement, of which is not the case, regardless, I am of the opinion that they are entitled to their perspective, however inaccurate it may be.
I noticed that whenever I mentioned being from the Middle Belt, people—particularly those from the North—opposed the identity and were quick to insist that I was part of Arewa or the North.
This persistent effort to associate me with the Arewa identity piqued my curiosity, which led me on a journey to investigate what the Arewa identity was truly about.
The term "Arewa" was first introduced in 1948 as a designation for the Hausa and Fulani communities, under the socio-cultural organization Jama'a Mutanen Arewa, established by the Sardauna of Sokoto. At its inception in colonial Nigeria, the Arewa identity was narrowly defined, focusing exclusively on the ethnic interests of the Hausa and Fulani people.
The socio-cultural organization eventually evolved into a political party known as the Northern Progressives Congress (NPC). To consolidate its power, the NPC expanded the concept of Arewa to encompass the minority regions of the Middle Belt, a strategic move typical of political parties aiming to gather votes and secure electoral victories.
It's important to remember that, at its inception, Arewa was intended exclusively for the Hausa and Fulani people. And that while Jama'a Mutanen Arewa was being established for the Hausa and Fulani people, other minority groups were actively forming their own tribal organizations and developing distinct identities, which they leveraged in dealings with the British colonial authorities. These minorities were not passively waiting to be integrated into what eventually became the Northern Progressives Congress.
For instance, the Kanuris established the Borno Youth Movement in 1945, predating Jama'a Mutanen Arewa, and thus were not part of the Arewa identity.
Similarly, Middle Belt groups such as the Berom, founded the Berom Development Union in 1945 to address their tribal interests, which also placed them outside the Arewa socio-cultural organization. Other groups that similarly maintained their distinct identities and formed their socio cultural groups outside Arewa include the Tiv, Mada, Igala, Bachama, Jukun, Gbagyi, Nupe, and others.
If these groups had their own distinct identities separate from Jama'a Mutanen Arewa, it raises the question of how they could suddenly be considered part of Arewa, both historically and at present.
This led me to realize that the Arewa identity never truly included my people. It was originally a socio-cultural organization that evolved into a political party, and the relevance of Arewa would remain as it was in the first republic, an identity for only the Hausa and Fulani and a political party where people can choose to be a part of, or disregard.
Therefore, any attempts to include my people under the Arewa identity afterwards is a clear indication that it is driven by political interests and efforts to relive the past failures of the first republic
Moving beyond research pertaining to the Arewa identity, my next focus was to understand what the Middle Belt truly represented.
The Sardauna of Sokoto provided more context of the Middle Belt in his book, My Life, where he had this to say:
"There was 3 groups which made the most noise, two of these were in the other regions and need not concern us, but the 3rd was the group advocating the so called Middle Belt.
" A long slice of country, running along both sides of the rivers Niger and Benue with an extension to cover the Plateau and Southern Zaria."
Another perspective is provided by Sir Bryan Smith, former Governor-General of Northern Nigeria, in his book But Always as Friends. He notes:
The expression Middle belt had been coined between the worlds to describe those parts of Northern Nigeria which lay athwart the Niger and Benue, between the country of the Igbo and the Yoruba and the Savannah lands of the boarder emirates
The 6 provinces which lay within this belt differed in many ways from their Northern neighbours, the rainfall was higher, the farmlands, more fertile, and though Islam had its outposts and its spheres of influence particularly in the towns and among the ruling caste, its adherent's were overall in the minority. Finally, Hausa was the Lingua franca and not the mother tongue".
A third definition is found in a 1958 memorandum from the Northern regional government to the Willink Minorities Commission, which defined the Middle Belt as:
"The whole of Ilorin, Kabba, Benue and Plateau Provinces, the Southern parts of Bauchi and Zaria provinces, the whole of Niger province except for the area North of Kontagoratown and the whole of the Numan Division of admawa Province together with the districts of Muri and Wurkum in the Muri division and the same province.
Thus, we have a clear and authoritative definition on the matter, provided by sources outside the Middle Belt itself, despite various attempts to alter historical facts.
Some have even introduced unnecessary distinctions between geography and politics that were not addressed by the most revered politician in their regions history, or the Northern regional government.
What we are witnessing is simply an attempt to create complications by outsiders where none exist.
After this part, at least I understood the definition and territories. My research took me to another critical issue which I was determined to investigate
It involved the question of why some Arewa people were so opposed to the Middle Belt identity and were determined to refer to the people of central Nigeria as Northerners. What is their motivation for this?
In his book Oil, Politics and Violence, by Max Suillon, he gives us insight to this issue
According to him, the North has long valued its numerical advantage and feared the educational prowess of the South. To counter this, they sought to consolidate a large, unified region.
What struck me the most after reading that is the ruthless nature of this approach, where the casualties from forced assimilation and unification are disregarded as long as the goal was achieved. This drive reflects a pursuit of dominance rather than genuine concern for the Middle Belt groups, because if there were genuine concern for the Middle Belt, wouldn't it have been evident in their response to the persistent herdsmen menace?
Instead, there has been a consistent effort to ignore our realities and justify the invasion of our communities by herdsmen, using terms like "foreign Fulani herders," "reprisal attacks,” "profiling" and "unaccommodating indigenes" to downplay and distract us from the crux of the matter which is that - Fulani mercenaries are attacking communities in our region.
A way for them to show genuine is for them to champion the end to Middle Belt killings, show concern around issues plaguing minorities like the erosion of languages, cultures, and traditions in the region due to forced assimilation
If these were done, there would be no doubt that Arewa had our interests at heart, but rather, they keep pushing for monolithicsm
Engaging with the younger ones from Arewa on social media proved to be the most suprising experience of them all
The younger generation of Arewa appeared even more reluctant to recognize the distinctions between the minority groups in the Middle Belt and the Hausa, Fulani, and Kanuri, despite the clear historical evidence that various persons presented to them.
I often heard remarks such as, "You must be Hausa because you speak the language," or "Don't you speak it at home? Don’t some of you have Hausa names?" “Some of your churches use Hausa too.”
The most triggering one was when one younger person alleged that the gbagyi was a sub group of the Hausa. I didn’t know that things had gotten this bad.
Regrettably, the situation is worse than I expected. The younger generation, who should be champions of minority rights and cultural preservation, are instead pushing an aggressive assimilation agenda.
One would have hoped that the younger Arewa generation would understand that a people's identity and how they define themselves should matter more than external labels or perceptions.
Therefore, it was heartening and encouraging to see young people from the Middle Belt, such as people of Marghi, Gbagyi, Tiv, Atyap, Ham, Tangale, and Zaar origin etc, standing firm and reaffirming their cultural identities on social media
The Middle Belt movement has been a breath of fresh air, rekindling awareness of the struggle against forced assimilation from the core North
Another prominent argument or reason from Arewa as to why they dislike the Middle Belt movement is on religious grounds. They claim that the Middle Belt identity is primarily Christian and anti Muslim and that its foundations were rooted in Christianity
I acknowledge the effectiveness of this strategy because, it is designed to create a rift between Muslims and Christians in the Middle Belt.
This division allows outsiders from the North to ally with the indigenous Muslim community, facilitating their influence in the region.
This tactic mirrors ancient Roman and Machiavellian strategies of divide and conquer.
To challenge the claim that the Middle Belt is exclusively Christian, we need to examine the origins of the first Middle Belt organization and political party.
What those making this assertion often overlook is that the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) has had several Muslim Secretaries Generals over time. Notably, Mallam Abdul Ado Ibrahim and Bello Ijumu held these positions. The Middle Belt movement has consistently included influential Muslims, such as Yerima Balla, a Kilba Muslim too.
Therefore, it is difficult to classify the movement as Christian when Muslims have always been represented and actively involved in the party and the primary objectives have been ethnic and regional emancipation
Another point which refutes the assertion that the Middle Belt movement was primarily Christian, is that majority of the population in the Middle Belt region were even traditionalist at the inception of the Middle Belt political party, not Muslims or Christians. For instance, according to the 1952 population census, these were the groups with their traditionalist population:
Adamawa had 63% traditionalists, Nasarawa 68% traditionalists, Taraba 78% traditionalists, Plateau 63% traditionalists and Benue 90% traditionalists.
Given this predominantly traditionalist demographic, it is incongruous to label any leadership emanating from such a group as Christian. As such, any assertion of the sort reflects a failure to appreciate the dynamics between traditionalism and Christianity.
Even the anrgument often raised is that missionaries established schools in the Middle Belt, and that the region’s leaders were influenced by these groups.
While it is true that missionaries played a significant role in education across the Middle Belt, as they did throughout the country, their impact should not be over exaggerated.
They also set up schools in Arewa, including in Zaria, Bauchi, Sokoto, and Maiduguri, which similarly contributed to literacy and education in the Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri areas. If we don’t typically question the influence of missionary education on graduates from Arewa; then why single out the Middle Belt, where many were traditionalists, for such scrutiny?
To emphasize the fact that it had no religious tonality to it, we access the matter of alliances. Under Joseph Tarka, the UMBC allied with the Borno Youth Movement (BYM), which was predominantly Muslim, as well as with Amino Kano’s Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU).
The UMBC even collaborated with NEPU to form the UPGA for the 1964 elections. In contrast, the Sardauna of Sokoto, through the NPC, was in opposition to the Kanuri movement, resulting in clashes between NPC and BYM members in Borno at various periods in the first republic.
According to Dudley, the NPC even told NPC supporters that attacking and killing Middle Belt opposition members was not a sin, as they were kaffirs and religious heretics
If anything, the UMBC was tolerant and the NPC which boasted of all Arewa modern hero's, were not as much
The UMBC had even also supported Muslim candidate Imam Ibrahim in the Tiv-Jembagh division, placing their candidates aside in their alliance with the Borno Youth Movement.
For instance, Mbaakaa Indiorhwer, the incumbent member of the Northern House of Assembly, was asked to step down for a second term, along with other UMBC supporters like Ayila Yough, for Imam Ibrahim as noted in "Tiv Riots and Aftermaths" by Agehe. Similarly, at national level, the UMBC had an alliance with Awolowos Action Group - even in that alliance had the Ilorin division who were predominantly Muslims too in that alliance, as such, the argument falls on its head
What even makes that assertion egregious is that
according to Gasset, "The Fulani in the past, sometimes prevented local people from converting to Islam. Until the late 1950s, those who tried to convert or those who were involved in proselytizing were often beaten and jailed by the sultans. The ruling class, which identified itself by its religion, showed little interest in assimilating the local population. Islam only became more inclusive in the late 1950s when democratic elections required the Fulani rulers to seek support from the local people."
Given this history, it is then strange to accuse the Middle Belt of being anti Islam when they were denied entry in the first republic
As I continued to do my research, I realized something very fascinating. I had read about concerns about the formation of the Middle Belt political party.
The argument goes that various tribal groups from the Middle Belt, such as the Tiv Progressive Union and the Berom Progressive Union, merged to form the Middle Belt Party. This organization later combined with the Non-Muslim League, an assembly of missionaries, to create the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC). This merger is used to argue that the UMBC was thus influenced by Christian interests.
What is often overlooked in this argument is that the rapid expansion and mergers that characterized the UMBC's growth led to its own complications. The Non-Muslim League eventually rebranded as the Middle Zone League, and its member, David Lot, later left to join the Sardauna’s party, the NPC.
Isn't it ironic that a former member of the Non-Muslim League, accused of influencing the UMBC, would then align with the Sardauna of Sokotos political party and yet would not get notoriety or get scarred by such association?
In 1955, Pastor David Lot and his supporters joined the NPC, but somehow, that part of the history of the Non Muslim league isn’t told
Why did David Lots association not imply to the people of Arewa extraction, that the NPC (Northern Progressives Congress) which was formerly Jama'a Mutanen Arewa became a Christian organization?
If not, why should the UMBC which controlled a majorly traditionalist area be labeled Christian simply because of Lot and his groups association?
Ultimately, this analysis demonstrates that characterizing the Middle Belt as a Christian movement is a fallacy. The Middle Belt movement was and still is, inclusive, encompassing Muslims, Christians, and traditionalists alike.
That commitment has remained since the first republic, and even at present, Yusufu E. Jibrin, the current Vice President of the Middle Belt Forum, is a devout Muslim.
The movement has always aimed to foster collaboration among all communities in the region. Its core mission remains to address and advocate for the needs of the people within the Middle Belt.
The people of the Middle Belt have consistently pursued autonomy. Since the early 1900s, as detailed by Logams, tribal groups have been advocating for independence from the British indirect rule system and its proxy arrangements with the Fulani. This quest for self-governance evolved into the Middle Belt movement, which remains focused on autonomy to this day, irrespective of religious or sectarian issues.
The Middle Belt's goal is not to be divided among various emirates by the Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri but to maintain self-rule as autonomous units. Recent developments, such as the fragmentation of chiefdoms in Southern Kaduna under El-Rufai’s leadership and the weakening of traditional institutions, highlight the fact that the issues we faced in the first republic are not over
Similarly, in Adamawa and Borno, the Uba people lack a unified political structure; parts of them are attached to the Shehu of Borno, while others fall under the Lamido of Adamawa. This raises the question: why can't these groups have their own traditional institutions? Why are they still divided between the Kanuri and Fulani in 2024?
Why don’t the Bura have their own native traditional stool. I met a Bura man in Adamawa who complained about this bitterly. He said his alleged traditional stool is in another state “Borno” and not even an ethnic stool at that, but a religious one controlled by external interests
Similarly, Southern Bauchi has been without a local government secretariat for years. The state's government has not recognized their traditional seat, and the 1991 report recommending a formal traditional structure for the Zaar people remains unimplemented. Compounding the issue, the Zaar king was illegally arrested and detained last year.
In Gombe, the Governor's attempt to impose a candidate on the Tangale people which led to protests and a crackdowns, illustrates the ongoing struggle for autonomy rather than religious issues. This is a key concern for many of us.
How about the Lelna, Reshi, Kamberi, Achipu in Southern Kebbi, why can’t they be uniform in an autonomous Kainji group with their traditional structure? Why must they be attached to the Kebbi as well as other emirates.
The desire for self-governance mirrors the Fulani's historic resistance against British control, albeit under different circumstances. We, too, seek autonomy and reject being subsumed under the traditional institutions of other ethnic groups.
As Middle Belt people, we recognize that governors hold power over traditional rulers, who are essential to preserving culture and tradition.
When politicians undermine our traditional structures by replacing our leaders with their own and allowing other ethnicities, like the Fulani, to influence traditional leadership positions, it perpetuates a form of internal colonialism.
Religion often becomes a tool for self-preservation in such oppressive contexts, but if we had the autonomy and rights we seek, many of these issues like religious conservativism would be non existent.
Thus, the Middle Belt's advocacy for our people's rights and freedoms remains a fundamental and ongoing effort.