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TUESDAY ESSAY: Some Nagging Questions, Post-Fuel-Subsidy Removal

January 3, 2012

INTRODUCTION: The  abrupt January 1 2012 subsidy removal in Nigeria, now increasingly dubbed "de-regulation in the downstream petroleum industry," is posing new challenges both to the Nigerian citizenry (in terms of direct increase in fuel price, transportation and of other essential commodities due to the impact of the petrol "macro-product") and to the Federal Government (in terms of protests from various sectors of civil society).  
 
The coming days and weeks will be crucial in determining where the pendulum will swing over the issue.  The coming months and years will also see whether private investors will come rushing into the downstream sector, because without a national consensus, private money tends to bide its time, fearing future policy reversals.

SOME BACKGROUND INFORMATION

According to reliable information, Nigeria's petroleum products consumption pattern is heavily weighted towards Gasoline (PMS Premium Motor Spirit), which takes up almost 80%, with Diesel (AGO Automotive Gas Oil)  almost 10% and Kerosene (House-hold Kerosene HHK and Aviation Turbine Kerosene ATK) about 10%. (See Table 1.)  There is also the data (see Figure 1) to show that  our daily crude oil demand in Nigeria is actually less that 300,000 barrels per day, and that the actual figure could be as low as 215,000 bpd but probably no more than 275,000 bpd at this time.

When we note that Nigeria is an oil-producing country with 2.5 million barrels per day of production,  endowed with valuable "sweet" crude (see Table 2),  then refining only 12% of our oil would fulfil our local demands.  It would also be wise to increase that refining capacity to 20-50% for local consumption expansion and regional and global export purposes.

On that score, Nigeria has three complex oil refineries (in Kaduna, Warri and Port Harcourt (with two complexes)), with a total name-plate capacity of 445,000 barrels per day only,  and with theoretically favorable product yields structure (see Tables 3a, 3b and 3c).  What that means is that if these refineries could run at only 70% efficiency, they would supply more than our daily needs.  Alas, for the past ten years, none of the refineries has ever run above 61% if at all, often running significantly less than half of that figure, and averaging about 30% in those ten years (See Table 4.)

What the above information means is that in order to meet our daily needs, Nigeria has had to import on average 40% of our daily needs for petroleum products, and sometimes as high as 80-90% - which is a huge net drain on our foreign reserves, bearing in mind that we first have to sell and transport the crude abroad, refine it there, transport the refined products back, with freight and insurance charges,  port/demurrage costs, etc., all with margin charges as well as hidden transaction (and corruption) costs.  

Which brings us all to the vexing question of fuel subsidy.   Government, defining it as the difference between the landing cost of imported fuel and the government-fixed pump price (for example N141 - N65 = N76 per liter for PMS, and N148.98-N50 = N98.98 for HHK), says it can no longer afford it (at least for PMS), therefore abruptly discontinuing it effective January 1, 2012.  (See new PPPRA Table 5 below).  

Based on a 76:6 volume ratio of PMS:HHK consumption estimate (see Table 1), and the disclosure that N1.4 trillion (N1,400,000 million) was  spent in 2011, that  roughly comes to unverified amounts of 16,700 million liters of PMS per year and 1,300 million liters of HHK per year - or about 46 million liters per day of PMS and 3.6 million liters per day of HHK.  If it is the often stated consumption of 32 million liters per day of PMS that we were paying for, then that would mean 14 million liters per day of HHK.

SOME NAGGING QUESTIONS

These latest calculations bring to mind four more vexing questions that need to be fully addressed before this pill of fuel subsidy removal can be "sweetened",  trust (re-)established between the "governors" and the governed, and confidence built:

1.  Were these fuel consumption estimates real or imagined - that is,  the PMS (46 million or 32 million liters?) and HHK (3.6 million or 14 million liters?) consumptions ?  Or  did the subsidy collectors  - those 100+ companies of Majors, Petrol Depot Owners and Independent Marketers and Road Construction Companies  (see summary in Table 7) - merely quote figures for which the federal government paid up, or were there credible checks on the actual amount of petroleum product delivered?   

2.  If not, is there a refund possible, particularly from those subsidy collectors who illegally used their HHK allocation as asphalt cutback for road construction?  Or will we just allow the manipulators of the system get away with impunity, when they have been identified so publicly, and make the Nigerian masses to suffer the consequences of inflated subsidy now being removed?

3.  With PMS price previously set at N65 per liter and HHK at N50 per liter, should we have, as an oil-producing nation, despite being forced by refining incompetence (or sabotage?) to import products, been subtracting  these figures from international prices of N141 and N148.98 respectively, or should we not be comparing them with the much less local prices as given for example in Table 6 - between N35 per liter to N65 per liter by some estimates, with the concomitant argument that there is in fact no subsidy?  Can we come to some agreement on these figures, as part of the confidence-building measures?

4.  why can't we just simply make one or more of our refineries work (as a national emergency commitment) to almost maximum capacity first before phasing out the subsidy removal, preferably on a quarterly basis?  Should that not be a major focus of the SURE (Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment) program, at least from the federal government angle?

5.   why can't we begin to ensure that the fore-gone SURE money - rather than being allocated according to the usual Federal Account Allocation Committee (FAAC) formula -  be considered a SPECIAL INTERVENTION Fund at least for the next five years and distributed as shown in Tables 8 and 9, with specifications of  70% for INFRASTRUCTURE and 30% for SOCIAL SAFETY NET?  Then we assign SPECIFIC tasks to the various tiers of government based on their best readiness/appropriateness to intervene - rather than having the federal government do EVERYTHING and the lower tiers do NOTHING IN PARTICULAR -  and use objective measures (population, area) to allocate the money?  Then there would be greater possibility of holding all tiers of government accountable, particularly if furthermore monitoring boards are set up at the federal, state and local government levels -  - not just one federal board, as recently announced to be led by Dr. Christopher Kolade -  comprised more of civil society members than government officials , which bureaucracy can be paid for by some of the N31.37 billion SURE money currently allocated to "Transfer" . These boards would ensure "adequate oversight, accountability and implementation of the various projects" etc. as suggested in the FGN's SURE program document.
 
These are questions begging for answers, with those answers blowing in the wind.

Have a Happier New Year.

 

  TABLE 1:  NIGERIA’S PETROLEUM PRODUCTS CONSUMPTION PATTERN (2009)

(After E.J. Omonbude, NAEE Conference, Abuja, 2011)

S/N

Fuel Type

Fuel Type
Abbreviation

%

1

Premium Motor Spirit (Gasoline)

PMS

76

2

Automotive Gas Oil (Diesel)

AGO

9

3

Aviation Turbine Kerosene

ATK

6

4

House-Hold Kerosene

HHK

6

5

Low Pour Fuel Oil

LPFO

2

6

Liquefied Petroleum Gas

LPG

0

7

Others….

Others

1

 

 

Total

100

 

TABLE 2: NIGERIA’S CRUDE AND THEIR CHARACTERIZATIONS
 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_crude_oil_products 

S/N

Product name

API gravity

Sulfur content
 (as % of mass)

1

Agbami

47.2°

0.044%

2

Amenam Blend

38.2°

0.12%

3

Amenam/Mars Blend

33.5°

0.94%

4

Antan Blend

26.4°

0.27%

5

Bonga

29.1

0.26%

6

Bonny Light

33.4°

0.16%

7

Brass River

n.a.

0.14%

8

EA Crude

35.1°

0.08%

9

Erha

31.8°

0.21%

10

Escravos

34.2°

0.17%

11

Forcados (to Europe)

30.8°

0.16%

 

Mixed Blend Sweet

 
 

12

Odudu

30.5°

0.15%

13

Okono

41.9°

0.06%

14

Oso Condensate

45.7°

0.06%

15

Pennington

35°

0.08%

16

Qua Iboe

36.3°

0.14%

17

Ukpokiti

41.7°

0.08%

18

Yoho Crude

39.3°

0.08%

 

 
 
 

 

WORLD CRUDE STANDARDS

 
 

1

Brent Blend (UK)

38.3°

0.37%

2

West Texas  Intermediate (USA)

39.6°

0.24%

 

*Note: Light crude: API>34, medium 31 < API < 33; heavy < 30;  Sweet crude: Sulfur < 0.5 wt. %; Sour: Sulfur > 1.0 wt. %

 
 

TABLE 3a:  NIGERIA's REFINERY YIELDS FROM MEDIUM CRUDE
(After E.J. Omonbude, NAEE Conference, Abuja, 2011)

S/N

Fuel Type

Simple
Refinery

Complex
Refinery

Very Complex
Refinery

1

Gasoline

30

50

60

2

Jet Fuel

10

10

10

3

Distillate Fuel

20

25

25

4

Residual Fuel

35

10

0

5

LPG

0

3

4

6

Coke

0

0

3

7

Refinery Fuel

8

12

13

 

Total

103

110

115

 

Table 3b:

Refinery product yields vary from different parts of the USA

 
http://www.petrostrategies.org/Learning_Center/Refining.htm
U.S. Refinery Yields , Percentage of Crude Oil Charge

Product

PADD I
East 
Coast

PADD II 
Midwest

PADD III
 Southwest 

PADD IV
Rocky Mountains

PADD V 
West Coast

Total US

LPGs

1.9

2.4

4.6

0.4

1.3

3.2

Gasoline

45.5

50.8

43.6

46.7

47.0

46.0

Jet Fuel

4.8

7.2

11.7

7.3

16.1

10.6

Distillate Fuel Oil

31.2

26.7

23.8

28.7

19.6

24.7

Residual Fuel Oil

8.6

2.3

5

1.9

6.4

5.0

Other 

13.0

15.7

18.2

18.9

16.0

16.6

Total

105.0

105.1

106.9

103.9

106.4

106.1

Source: EIA, Petroleum Supply Monthly, February 2001, Table 31.

Table 3c: What Does One Barrel Of Crude Oil Make?

  http://www.greensborogasprices.com/crude_products.aspx

  • One barrel of crude oil contains 42 gallons; 1 gallon is 3.785 liters
  • About 46% of each barrel of crude oil is refined into automobile gasoline
  • In the US and Canada an average of 3 gallons of crude oil are consumed per person each day
  • The US imports about 50% of its required crude oil and about 50% of that amount comes from OPEC countries

Product

Refined Gallons
/Barrel

Refined Liters
/Barrel

Barrel/Barrel
(%)

Gasoline

19.3

73.05

46

Distillate Fuel Oil
(Inc. Home Heating and Diesel Fuel)

9.83

37.21

23

Kerosene Type Jet Fuel

4.24

16.05

10

Residual Fuel Oil

2.10

7.95

5

Petroleum Coke

2.10

7.95

5

Liquified Refinery Gases

1.89

7.15

4.5

Still Gas

1.81

6.85

4.3

Asphalt and Road Oil

1.13

4.28

2.7

Petrochemical Feed Supplies

0.97

3.67

2.3

Lubricants

0.46

1.74

1.1

Kerosene

0.21

0.79

0.5

Waxes

0.04

0.15

0.1

Aviation Fuel

0.04

0.15

0.1

Other Products

0.34

1.29

0.8

Total

44.46

168.28

105.4

Processing Gain

2.47

9.35

5.4

Source: EIA March 2004 Data

 

 

 
FIGURE 1:  Total Oil Consumption in Nigeria   (Omonbude, 2011)
 
 

 

Table 4:  Refinery Operating Efficiencies – 2001-2011
(Source: NNPC’s Annual Statistical Bulletin)

S/N

Year

Kaduna
%

Warri
%

Port Harcourt
%

Total/Avg
%

 

Name-Plate Capacity bpd

110,000

125,000

210,000

445,000

 

 

 

 

 

 

1

2001

31.39

48.29

60.73

49.98

2

2002

34.95

55.53

52.17

48.86

3

2003

15.96

14.27

41.88

27.72

4

2004

26.00

9.10

31.04

23.63

5

2005

33.08

54.85

42.18

43.49

6

2006

8.34

3.85

50.26

26.86

7

2007

0.00

0.00

24.87

11.74

8

2008

19.56

38.52

17.84

24.07

9

2009

20.02

43.01

9.08

21.32

10

2010

20.46

43.36

9.17

21.56

 

Avg 2001-2010

20.97

31.08

33.92

29.92

11

Q1 2011 (Jan-March)

9.02

24.93

11.94

14.87

12

Q2 2011 (April-June)

27.78

38.40

16.87

25.61

Table 5:  New Petroleum Products Regime in Nigeria
See:  http://www.pppra-nigeria.org/
 

1st January - 15th January, 2012

Products (per litre)

 

 PMS 

AGO

HHK

 ATK 

LPFO

Landing Cost + Other Charges

131.66

149.15

148.98

143.50

111.16

Ex-Depot

 

 

40.66

 

 

Maximum Indicative Benchmark Depot Price

131.66

 

 

 

 

Margins

9.34

9.34

9.34

9.65

11.16

Expected Open Market  Price

 

143.02

50.00

153.15

122.87

Maximum Indicative Benchmark Open Market  Price

141.00

 

 

 

 

 
 
 
Table 6:  International vs. Local Prices for Crude and Refined Products
 

 

S/N

Item

Breakdown
Costs
N/liter
KSA *(Abdullahi)

Cost
1
N/liter

Cost
2
N/liter

Cost
3
N/liter

Comment

Cost
4
Breakdown
Costs
N/liter
IA (Agbon)*

Cost
5
 

1a

Exploration

0.02

 

 

 

 

0

 

1b

Development

22.64

 

 

 

 

5.03

 

1c

Operation

2.83

 

 

 

 

0

 

 

Subtotal

25.49

 

 

 

 

5.03

 

1d

Add 5.25% losses

1.34

 

 

 

 

0

 

1

Total Cost of Crude Oil

 

26.83

26.83

100

Costs 1, 2 &4 based
 on 1a-1d (Local pricing); 
Costs 3 & 5 based on international pricing

5.03

100

2

Refining

 

25.36

25.36

25.36

 

12.68

12.68

3

Distribution

 

2.42

13.20

13.20

Cost 1 for Items 3 and 4 based 
on 2005 info;  
Cost 2 & 3 for Items 3 and 4 based on 2011 info

17.31

17.31

4

Marketing

 

5.87

0

0

0

0

5

Tax

 

0

0

0

 

5.00

18.56

 

Total

 

60.48

65.39

138.56

 

40.02

148.55

 
*KSA stands for Kasim Sulaiman Abdullahi;  see http://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=303255423046329&id=111678125537394  "Economics of Crude Oil Refining and Marketing in Nigeria"

  IA stands for Izielen Agbon:  see http://saharareporters.com/article/real-cost-nigeria-petrol-dr-izielen-agbon "The Real Cost of Nigerian Petrol"

TABLE 7:  FUEL SUBSIDY BENEFICIARIES’ NUMBERS BY YEAR

S/N

YEAR

TOTAL
NUMBER

NAMES

1

2006

3

Majors: MRS, Total and Oando

2

2007

8

Add 5:
Majors: AP and Mobil 
Petrol Depot Owners: NIPCO
Independent Marketers: AITEO Energy Resources and Triquest

3

2008

23

Add 15:
Major: Conoil
Petrol Depot Owners: Capital Oil, Folawiyo Energy
Independent Marketers: Triquest Oil Services, IMAD Oil & Gas, 
Integrated Oil and Gas, Rahamaniyya, AMG,  Petro Energy, 
Brittania, ACORN, A-Z Petrolleum, SHIELD Petroleum, 
MAJOPE Investment Limited

4

2010

36

Majors: 6
Petrol Depot Owners: 2
Independent Marketers: 28

5

2011

100+?

Majors, Petrol Depot Owners, Independent Marketers  & Road Construction Companies?

TABLE 8: SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION (Based on Greater Emphasis on Infrastructure, and De-Emphasis on Derivation in FAAC Allocation)
 

S/N

TIER OF GOVERNMENT

INFR.

SOC. SAF. NET

AMOUNT
(Naira, Billion)

%

 

Current SURE
Distribution

%

1

Federal + FCT

493.97

79.38

573.35

51%

 

488.35

43%

2

State

138.93

125.70

264.63

23%

 

411.03

36%

3

Local

138.93

125.70

264.63

23%

 

203.23

18%

 

Sub-Total

771.83

330.78

1102.61

97%

 

1102.61

97%

5

Transfers

 

 

31.37

3%

 

31.37

3%

 

Total

 

 

1133.98

100.00%

 

1133.98

100.00%

 

 
TABLE 9:  SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE SURE MONEY  DISTRIBUTION – TIER-BY-TIER, PROGRAM-BY-PROGRAM

S/N

EXPENDITURE ITEM

Federal

State

Local+FCT

Total

 

(i) SOCIAL SAFETY NETS: 

 

 

 

 

1

Maternal and child health services,

-

-

125.70

125.70

2

Public works/youth employment programme

52.92

-

-

52.92

3

Urban mass transit scheme

-

125.70

-

125.70

4

Vocational training schemes

26.46

-

-

26.46

 

Sub-Total, Social Safety Net

79.38

125.70

125.70

330.78

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 (ii) INFRASTRUCTURE 

 

 

 

 

5

Roads and Rail

164.66
(rail)

46.31
(roads)

-

210.97

6

Water Resources 

-

-

138.93

138.93

7

Refineries

329.31

-

-

329.31

8

Power

-

92.62

-

92.62

 

Sub-Total, Infrastructure

493.97

138.93

138.93

771.83

 

 

 

 

 

Grand Total

573.35

264.63

264.63

1102.61

 
 

INTRODUCTION: The  abrupt January 1 2012 subsidy removal in Nigeria, now increasingly dubbed "de-regulation in the downstream petroleum industry," is posing new challenges both to the Nigerian citizenry (in terms of direct increase in fuel price, transportation and of other essential commodities due to the impact of the petrol "macro-product") and to the Federal Government (in terms of protests from various sectors of civil society).     The coming days and weeks will be crucial in determining where the pendulum will swing over the issue.  The coming months and years will also see whether private investors will come rushing into the downstream sector, because without a national consensus, private money tends to bide its time, fearing future policy reversals.

SOME BACKGROUND INFORMATION
According to reliable information, Nigeria's petroleum products consumption pattern is heavily weighted towards Gasoline (PMS Premium Motor Spirit), which takes up almost 80%, with Diesel (AGO Automotive Gas Oil)  almost 10% and Kerosene (House-hold Kerosene HHK and Aviation Turbine Kerosene ATK) about 10%. (See Table 1.)  There is also the data (see Figure 1) to show that  our daily crude oil demand in Nigeria is actually less that 300,000 barrels per day, and that the actual figure could be as low as 215,000 bpd but probably no more than 275,000 bpd at this time.
When we note that Nigeria is an oil-producing country with 2.5 million barrels per day of production,  endowed with valuable "sweet" crude (see Table 2),  then refining only 12% of our oil would fulfil our local demands.  It would also be wise to increase that refining capacity to 20-50% for local consumption expansion and regional and global export purposes.
On that score, Nigeria has three complex oil refineries (in Kaduna, Warri and Port Harcourt (with two complexes)), with a total name-plate capacity of 445,000 barrels per day only,  and with theoretically favorable product yields structure (see Tables 3a, 3b and 3c).  What that means is that if these refineries could run at only 70% efficiency, they would supply more than our daily needs.  Alas, for the past ten years, none of the refineries has ever run above 61% if at all, often running significantly less than half of that figure, and averaging about 30% in those ten years (See Table 4.)
What the above information means is that in order to meet our daily needs, Nigeria has had to import on average 40% of our daily needs for petroleum products, and sometimes as high as 80-90% - which is a huge net drain on our foreign reserves, bearing in mind that we first have to sell and transport the crude abroad, refine it there, transport the refined products back, with freight and insurance charges,  port/demurrage costs, etc., all with margin charges as well as hidden transaction (and corruption) costs.  
Which brings us all to the vexing question of fuel subsidy.   Government, defining it as the difference between the landing cost of imported fuel and the government-fixed pump price (for example N141 - N65 = N76 per liter for PMS, and N148.98-N50 = N98.98 for HHK), says it can no longer afford it (at least for PMS), therefore abruptly discontinuing it effective January 1, 2012.  (See new PPPRA Table 5 below).  
Based on a 76:6 volume ratio of PMS:HHK consumption estimate (see Table 1), and the disclosure that N1.4 trillion (N1,400,000 million) was  spent in 2011, that  roughly comes to unverified amounts of 16,700 million liters of PMS per year and 1,300 million liters of HHK per year - or about 46 million liters per day of PMS and 3.6 million liters per day of HHK.  If it is the often stated consumption of 32 million liters per day of PMS that we were paying for, then that would mean 14 million liters per day of HHK.

SOME NAGGING QUESTIONS
These latest calculations bring to mind four more vexing questions that need to be fully addressed before this pill of fuel subsidy removal can be "sweetened",  trust (re-)established between the "governors" and the governed, and confidence built:
1.  Were these fuel consumption estimates real or imagined - that is,  the PMS (46 million or 32 million liters?) and HHK (3.6 million or 14 million liters?) consumptions ?  Or  did the subsidy collectors  - those 100+ companies of Majors, Petrol Depot Owners and Independent Marketers and Road Construction Companies  (see summary in Table 7) - merely quote figures for which the federal government paid up, or were there credible checks on the actual amount of petroleum product delivered?   
2.  If not, is there a refund possible, particularly from those subsidy collectors who illegally used their HHK allocation as asphalt cutback for road construction?  Or will we just allow the manipulators of the system get away with impunity, when they have been identified so publicly, and make the Nigerian masses to suffer the consequences of inflated subsidy now being removed?
3.  With PMS price previously set at N65 per liter and HHK at N50 per liter, should we have, as an oil-producing nation, despite being forced by refining incompetence (or sabotage?) to import products, been subtracting  these figures from international prices of N141 and N148.98 respectively, or should we not be comparing them with the much less local prices as given for example in Table 6 - between N35 per liter to N65 per liter by some estimates, with the concomitant argument that there is in fact no subsidy?  Can we come to some agreement on these figures, as part of the confidence-building measures?
4.  why can't we just simply make one or more of our refineries work (as a national emergency commitment) to almost maximum capacity first before phasing out the subsidy removal, preferably on a quarterly basis?  Should that not be a major focus of the SURE (Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment) program, at least from the federal government angle?
5.   why can't we begin to ensure that the fore-gone SURE money - rather than being allocated according to the usual Federal Account Allocation Committee (FAAC) formula -  be considered a SPECIAL INTERVENTION Fund at least for the next five years and distributed as shown in Tables 8 and 9, with specifications of  70% for INFRASTRUCTURE and 30% for SOCIAL SAFETY NET?  Then we assign SPECIFIC tasks to the various tiers of government based on their best readiness/appropriateness to intervene - rather than having the federal government do EVERYTHING and the lower tiers do NOTHING IN PARTICULAR -  and use objective measures (population, area) to allocate the money?  Then there would be greater possibility of holding all tiers of government accountable, particularly if furthermore monitoring boards are set up at the federal, state and local government levels -  - not just one federal board, as recently announced to be led by Dr. Christopher Kolade -  comprised more of civil society members than government officials , which bureaucracy can be paid for by some of the N31.37 billion SURE money currently allocated to "Transfer" . These boards would ensure "adequate oversight, accountability and implementation of the various projects" etc. as suggested in the FGN's SURE program document.   These are questions begging for answers, with those answers blowing in the wind.
Have a Happier New Year.
 
  TABLE 1:  NIGERIA’S PETROLEUM PRODUCTS CONSUMPTION PATTERN (2009)

(After E.J. Omonbude, NAEE Conference, Abuja, 2011)



S/N

Fuel Type

Fuel Type

Abbreviation

%

1

Premium Motor Spirit (Gasoline)

PMS

76

2

Automotive Gas Oil (Diesel)

AGO

9

3

Aviation Turbine Kerosene

ATK

6

4

House-Hold Kerosene

HHK

6

5

Low Pour Fuel Oil

LPFO

2

6

Liquefied Petroleum Gas

LPG

0

7

Others….

Others

1

 

 

Total

100

 


TABLE 2: NIGERIA’S CRUDE AND THEIR CHARACTERIZATIONS

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_crude_oil_products 


S/N

Product name

API gravity

Sulfur content

 (as % of mass)

1

Agbami

47.2°

0.044%

2

Amenam Blend

38.2°

0.12%

3

Amenam/Mars Blend

33.5°

0.94%

4

Antan Blend

26.4°

0.27%

5

Bonga

29.1

0.26%

6

Bonny Light

33.4°

0.16%

7

Brass River

n.a.

0.14%

8

EA Crude

35.1°

0.08%

9

Erha

31.8°

0.21%

10

Escravos

34.2°

0.17%

11

Forcados (to Europe)

30.8°

0.16%

 

Mixed Blend Sweet

   

12

Odudu

30.5°

0.15%

13

Okono

41.9°

0.06%

14

Oso Condensate

45.7°

0.06%

15

Pennington

35°

0.08%

16

Qua Iboe

36.3°

0.14%

17

Ukpokiti

41.7°

0.08%

18

Yoho Crude

39.3°

0.08%

 

     

 

WORLD CRUDE STANDARDS

   

1

Brent Blend (UK)

38.3°

0.37%

2

West Texas  Intermediate (USA)

39.6°

0.24%

 

*Note: Light crude: API>34, medium 31 < API < 33; heavy < 30;  Sweet crude: Sulfur < 0.5 wt. %; Sour: Sulfur > 1.0 wt. %
   

TABLE 3a:  NIGERIA's REFINERY YIELDS FROM MEDIUM CRUDE

(After E.J. Omonbude, NAEE Conference, Abuja, 2011)



S/N

Fuel Type

Simple

Refinery

Complex

Refinery

Very Complex

Refinery

1

Gasoline

30

50

60

2

Jet Fuel

10

10

10

3

Distillate Fuel

20

25

25

4

Residual Fuel

35

10

0

5

LPG

0

3

4

6

Coke

0

0

3

7

Refinery Fuel

8

12

13

 

Total

103

110

115

 
Table 3b:

Refinery product yields vary from different parts of the USA

 

http://www.petrostrategies.org/Learning_Center/Refining.htm

U.S. Refinery Yields , Percentage of Crude Oil Charge

Product

PADD I
East 
Coast

PADD II 
Midwest

PADD III
 Southwest 

PADD IV
Rocky Mountains

PADD V 
West Coast

Total US

LPGs

1.9

2.4

4.6

0.4

1.3

3.2

Gasoline

45.5

50.8

43.6

46.7

47.0

46.0

Jet Fuel

4.8

7.2

11.7

7.3

16.1

10.6

Distillate Fuel Oil

31.2

26.7

23.8

28.7

19.6

24.7

Residual Fuel Oil

8.6

2.3

5

1.9

6.4

5.0

Other 

13.0

15.7

18.2

18.9

16.0

16.6

Total

105.0

105.1

106.9

103.9

106.4

106.1

Source: EIA, Petroleum Supply Monthly, February 2001, Table 31.



Table 3c: What Does One Barrel Of Crude Oil Make?


  http://www.greensborogasprices.com/crude_products.aspx

  • One barrel of crude oil contains 42 gallons; 1 gallon is 3.785 liters
  • About 46% of each barrel of crude oil is refined into automobile gasoline
  • In the US and Canada an average of 3 gallons of crude oil are consumed per person each day
  • The US imports about 50% of its required crude oil and about 50% of that amount comes from OPEC countries

Product

Refined Gallons

/Barrel

Refined Liters

/Barrel

Barrel/Barrel

(%)

Gasoline

19.3

73.05

46

Distillate Fuel Oil

(Inc. Home Heating and Diesel Fuel)

9.83

37.21

23

Kerosene Type Jet Fuel

4.24

16.05

10

Residual Fuel Oil

2.10

7.95

5

Petroleum Coke

2.10

7.95

5

Liquified Refinery Gases

1.89

7.15

4.5

Still Gas

1.81

6.85

4.3

Asphalt and Road Oil

1.13

4.28

2.7

Petrochemical Feed Supplies

0.97

3.67

2.3

Lubricants

0.46

1.74

1.1

Kerosene

0.21

0.79

0.5

Waxes

0.04

0.15

0.1

Aviation Fuel

0.04

0.15

0.1

Other Products

0.34

1.29

0.8

Total

44.46

168.28

105.4

Processing Gain

2.47

9.35

5.4

Source: EIA March 2004 Data

 

 

  FIGURE 1:  Total Oil Consumption in Nigeria   (Omonbude, 2011) Image removed.   
 

Table 4:  Refinery Operating Efficiencies – 2001-2011

(Source: NNPC’s Annual Statistical Bulletin)



S/N

Year

Kaduna

%

Warri

%

Port Harcourt

%

Total/Avg

%

 

Name-Plate Capacity bpd

110,000

125,000

210,000

445,000

 

 

 

 

 

 

1

2001

31.39

48.29

60.73

49.98

2

2002

34.95

55.53

52.17

48.86

3

2003

15.96

14.27

41.88

27.72

4

2004

26.00

9.10

31.04

23.63

5

2005

33.08

54.85

42.18

43.49

6

2006

8.34

3.85

50.26

26.86

7

2007

0.00

0.00

24.87

11.74

8

2008

19.56

38.52

17.84

24.07

9

2009

20.02

43.01

9.08

21.32

10

2010

20.46

43.36

9.17

21.56

 

Avg 2001-2010

20.97

31.08

33.92

29.92

11

Q1 2011 (Jan-March)

9.02

24.93

11.94

14.87

12

Q2 2011 (April-June)

27.78

38.40

16.87

25.61



Table 5:  New Petroleum Products Regime in Nigeria See:  http://www.pppra-nigeria.org/  

1st January - 15th January, 2012

Products (per litre)

 

 PMS 

AGO

HHK

 ATK 

LPFO

Landing Cost + Other Charges

131.66

149.15

148.98

143.50

111.16

Ex-Depot

 

 

40.66

 

 

Maximum Indicative Benchmark Depot Price

131.66

 

 

 

 

Margins

9.34

9.34

9.34

9.65

11.16

Expected Open Market  Price

 

143.02

50.00

153.15

122.87

Maximum Indicative Benchmark Open Market  Price

141.00

 

 

 

 

 
    Table 6:  International vs. Local Prices for Crude and Refined Products  

 

S/N

Item

Breakdown

Costs

N/liter

KSA *(Abdullahi)

Cost

1

N/liter

Cost

2

N/liter

Cost

3

N/liter

Comment

Cost

4

Breakdown

Costs

N/liter

IA (Agbon)*

Cost

5

 

1a

Exploration

0.02

 

 

 

 

0

 

1b

Development

22.64

 

 

 

 

5.03

 

1c

Operation

2.83

 

 

 

 

0

 

 

Subtotal

25.49

 

 

 

 

5.03

 

1d

Add 5.25% losses

1.34

 

 

 

 

0

 

1

Total Cost of Crude Oil

 

26.83

26.83

100

Costs 1, 2 &4 based

 on 1a-1d (Local pricing); 

Costs 3 & 5 based on international pricing

5.03

100

2

Refining

 

25.36

25.36

25.36

 

12.68

12.68

3

Distribution

 

2.42

13.20

13.20

Cost 1 for Items 3 and 4 based 

on 2005 info;  

Cost 2 & 3 for Items 3 and 4 based on 2011 info

17.31

17.31

4

Marketing

 

5.87

0

0

0

0

5

Tax

 

0

0

0

 

5.00

18.56

 

Total

 

60.48

65.39

138.56

 

40.02

148.55

 

*KSA stands for Kasim Sulaiman Abdullahi;  see http://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=303255423046329&id=111678125537394  "Economics of Crude Oil Refining and Marketing in Nigeria"


  IA stands for Izielen Agbon:  see http://saharareporters.com/article/real-cost-nigeria-petrol-dr-izielen-agbon "The Real Cost of Nigerian Petrol"



TABLE 7:  FUEL SUBSIDY BENEFICIARIES’ NUMBERS BY YEAR


S/N

YEAR

TOTAL

NUMBER

NAMES

1

2006

3

Majors: MRS, Total and Oando

2

2007

8

Add 5:

Majors: AP and Mobil 

Petrol Depot Owners: NIPCO

Independent Marketers: AITEO Energy Resources and Triquest

3

2008

23

Add 15:

Major: Conoil

Petrol Depot Owners: Capital Oil, Folawiyo Energy

Independent Marketers: Triquest Oil Services, IMAD Oil & Gas, 

Integrated Oil and Gas, Rahamaniyya, AMG,  Petro Energy, 

Brittania, ACORN, A-Z Petrolleum, SHIELD Petroleum, 

MAJOPE Investment Limited

4

2010

36

Majors: 6

Petrol Depot Owners: 2

Independent Marketers: 28

5

2011

100+?

Majors, Petrol Depot Owners, Independent Marketers  & Road Construction Companies?



TABLE 8: SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION (Based on Greater Emphasis on Infrastructure, and De-Emphasis on Derivation in FAAC Allocation)  

S/N

TIER OF GOVERNMENT

INFR.

SOC. SAF. NET

AMOUNT

(Naira, Billion)

%

 

Current SURE

Distribution

%

1

Federal + FCT

493.97

79.38

573.35

51%

 

488.35

43%

2

State

138.93

125.70

264.63

23%

 

411.03

36%

3

Local

138.93

125.70

264.63

23%

 

203.23

18%

 

Sub-Total

771.83

330.78

1102.61

97%

 

1102.61

97%

5

Transfers

 

 

31.37

3%

 

31.37

3%

 

Total

 

 

1133.98

100.00%

 

1133.98

100.00%


 

 

TABLE 9:  SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE SURE MONEY  DISTRIBUTION – TIER-BY-TIER, PROGRAM-BY-PROGRAM


S/N

EXPENDITURE ITEM

Federal

State

Local+FCT

Total

 

(i) SOCIAL SAFETY NETS: 

 

 

 

 


1


Maternal and child health services,


-



-


125.70


125.70


2


Public works/youth employment programme


52.92


-



-


52.92


3


Urban mass transit scheme


-



125.70


-


125.70


4


Vocational training schemes


26.46



-


-


26.46

 


Sub-Total, Social Safety Net


79.38


125.70


125.70


330.78

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 (ii) INFRASTRUCTURE 

 

 

 

 


5


Roads and Rail


164.66

(rail)



46.31

(roads)


-


210.97


6


Water Resources 


-


-


138.93


138.93



7


Refineries


329.31



-


-


329.31


8


Power


-


92.62



-


92.62

 


Sub-Total, Infrastructure


493.97


138.93


138.93


771.83


 

 

 

 





 


Grand Total


573.35


264.63


264.63


1102.61

 

 

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